Zumretay Arkin is a human rights activist and the Vice President of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC). She has held multiple roles within the organization, consistently advocating for the rights of Uyghurs worldwide. A recipient of the Roosevelt Foundation’s Freedom of Worship Award, Arkin also writes as a freelance contributor for the Hong Kong Free Press.
In this interview, Zumretay Arkin describes how China carries out transnational repression against Uyghur activists through digital surveillance with spyware and hacking, infiltration of diaspora communities, and coordinated disinformation campaigns using deepfakes and gendered slander, while also highlighting how Uyghurs are resisting and fighting back.
Scarlett Gamble: You’ve reported experiencing transnational repression by the Chinese government in many instances. What methods of repression have been used by the regime and how do these tactics interact with online spaces?
Zumretay Arkin: The Chinese government employs various tactics, but there are some shared experiences in the wider community. One of the most common methods used by the Chinese government is family hostage diplomacy, threatening the safety of relatives who are back in East Turkistan as a way of incentivizing targets abroad to stop engaging in activism and community engagement. I think that is the most favored method of the Chinese government, and it’s been used for decades now.
Another way of carrying out transnational repression is through video and phone calls. For example, Chinese police officers in mainland China or elsewhere will directly call community members to threaten them, discouraging them from attending political events or events related to the Uyghur community. Sometimes, they openly threaten them and their relatives back home, saying that a failure to comply with their orders might result in one’s family members being sent to a camp or a detention center, or enduring other types of abuse.
Nowadays, there’s also been an increase in digital surveillance targeting Uyghurs who are living abroad in exile. This usually happens through social media apps like WeChat and Whatsapp. The use of spyware and malware, as well as hacking, are all common in the digital space. These efforts are happening a lot more nowadays, and are easier for the Chinese government to carry out.
The government also engages in physical threats. This type of repression is less common but still present, especially around key commemorative events or protests. China engages in espionage and informant networks. By infiltrating diaspora communities, informants will seek information on specific individuals or organizations—something my organization has definitely faced. Over the last year, especially, we’ve seen well-documented misinformation and disinformation campaigns. There have been online slander campaigns with the aim of smearing activists, character assassinations, and generally attacking the reputation and credibility of individuals within the Uyghur community and in the activist space.
Last year, I was targeted by several disinformation campaigns that used deepfakes and online slander against me. Around the time I was running for Vice President of my organization, there were a couple of other videos as well. There was also a gendered aspect to the campaigns, which built an image that I was sleeping around, so basically slut-shaming female leaders within the organization.
The Chinese government also misuses international institutions or mechanisms as a method of transnational repression. There are more high profile cases of this; for example, the misuse of Interpol Red Notices to block activists from entering countries or to have them deported with abusive extradition requests. My organization has seen this frequently. The most high profile case is the one of Dolkun Isa, our former president, who had an Interpol Red Notice for twenty one years and was denied entry to various countries and almost extradited to China at some point. Idris Hasan, a Uyghur activist from Turkey, was detained in the Casablanca airport for over two years. These are more extreme cases, but this happens regularly as well.
Different repressive measures have been carried out by different actors, including the Chinese government, as well as Chinese state agencies including the [intelligence services of the] Public Security Bureau, the Interior Ministry, and the CCP United Front Work Department. We’ve seen cases with Chinese diaspora groups abroad as well as individual citizens—both Chinese and non-Chinese, in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Europe. International organizations and foreign governments are sometimes complicit in China’s transnational repression abuses, as well.
SG: What do you think about what social media platforms are doing to protect Uyghur activist voices?
ZA: I think they’re failing to respond effectively to protect activists. Transnational repression is carried out by all authoritarian actors including China, but most of the time the methods come from the same playbook. I have a lot of activist friends who have experienced transnational repression in one form or another. On X (formerly Twitter), for example, the platform was slow to respond. I’ve reported fake accounts and bots spreading hateful content or slander online using the general channels, and there’s no follow-through from X. It’s really difficult to bring a case to their attention; they’re not very responsive, and it takes ages for them to even get back to you.
It’s not really been positive in my experience across most platforms. There’s not much protection. I don’t think that there’s enough awareness, even, of the experiences of activists who are living the consequences of transnational repression through these social media platforms. I do think that there needs to be some sort of engagement and dialogue with these companies about these issues, because yes, there are measures that can be taken against hateful speech or content, but not necessarily about other issues like slander. It’s also a question of awareness, and I really don’t think that there’s enough right now.
SG: Given this lack of awareness and inadequate response from the platforms, are there any specific strategies you and other activists use to safeguard yourselves online?
ZA: There are some best practices that we try to implement in our daily lives and, as activists who are quite public, we need to be even more careful compared to any normal individual. Your digital footprint is extremely important. Using a VPN, for example, really decreases our chances of having our IP addresses stolen. Having an antivirus installed on your computer can be helpful. Being mindful that public WiFi is not always secure and of your location sharing are also measures that can mitigate some of the risks associated with activism.
Of course, when there are fake accounts or slander campaigns online, there’s not much that you can do. However, there’s always the option of documenting these cases. One can monitor these accounts and notify the appropriate social media platforms or the local authorities if the platforms are unresponsive. In fact, transnational repression is now becoming more of a hot topic within different governments, especially within the G7 countries, and so even governments have now started to look at this issue and think about ways to protect activists who are experiencing digital forms of transnational repression. This wasn’t something that was really thought about a couple of years ago, so we are working directly with governments to raise awareness about these forms of transnational repression. These methods are dangerous in their potential to lead to other abuses, including suicides and physical risks. These are things the governments should also be taking into account.
SG: Have you experienced situations where online threats or intimidation have resulted in offline danger for yourself or others? If so, how do you navigate that?
ZA: Specifically around the [2024 World Uyghur Congress] general assembly, there were a lot of different campaigns against not only myself, but also my colleagues who were running for different positions within the organization at the time. During the assembly and leading up to it, there were many incidents of spam emails, fake emails, slander campaigns, and AI deepfakes being employed against our organization and its members. There were also fake letters being sent in the organization’s name.
During our general assembly, I and some of my other colleagues received death threats over email. Two Chinese agents also followed one of our delegates from Ireland all the way to Bosnia, and they came to film and photograph some of our delegates who were in the lobby at the time. That was definitely one of the examples where there was physical proximity with those agents. Although they didn’t hurt anyone, they did take photos and videos against their will. Later on, some of our delegates who participated in the event received pressure from the Chinese government through their family members back home. There were also terrorist threats directed at four of our members and the organization as a whole, which we obviously had to report to the police and the relevant governments. We did, and received reinforced physical security on the ground.
Other than that, in my own experience, I’ve been followed many times. Whether it’s at the UN in Geneva by Chinese diplomats, or by Chinese Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations [GONGOs]. I’ve been followed in Australia during different events and my photo was taken.
SG: What are some of the key challenges faced by the Uyghur community in countering denialism and Chinese state propaganda online, and what steps do you believe are necessary to support Uyghur voices and advocacy efforts globally?
ZA: Right now, there’s a lot of denialism that can be seen online, and I think it’s important to mention that that could be characterized as another form of abuse in denying someone’s truth and lived experiences. I’d love to see other parties sharing these experiences and amplifying the voices of the Uyghur community. Right now, the Chinese government is spending so much resources, including funding, to not only silence our voices, but also to promote this narrative that everything back home is going positively. They hope to push a narrative of the central government carrying out policies that promote positive developments such as lifting Uyghurs out of poverty. There’s also the [government’s] use of influencers to promote a false image of stability, harmony, and ethnic unity in the region. We need to counter the propagandistic messaging of the Chinese government, and sharing the true stories of Uyghurs is an effective way to go about it.
Otherwise, transnational repression has been a persistent phenomenon and threat in activist spaces, which compounds the importance of documenting and reporting relevant incidents. It is so common it’s almost been normalized, which can take away from people’s perception of the scale and risks associated with transnational repression, decentering the impact on the entire community that’s present as well as the individual’s experience. For these reasons, I think it’s really important to report it to the relevant authorities.
Providing space for people to share their experiences and raise awareness is also key. Organizations who are working to defend the rights of Uyghur people need capacity and resources, so I think there is definitely a need for funding to continue supporting the relevant advocacy work as well.
SG: Going forward, what gives you hope in the work you do?
ZA: My community and the younger generation of Uyghurs are what give me hope. There is so much resilience and strength within our community, and despite all of the challenges and trauma that we continue to live, we are extremely resilient. We are able to celebrate small wins in spite of all those hardships and fight for a better future. The courage of the younger generation inspires me and drives me forward as well.