Muslims in Sri Lanka, making up less than 10 percent of the population, were once regarded as a “model minority” — integrated, loyal, and reliable. However, while tensions between the Sinhalese ethnic majority and the Muslim minority have long existed, violence and hate speech targeting Muslims have sharply intensified in the post-war period. The narrative has shifted, portraying Muslims as a threat — a violent and rebellious community.
Today, Muslims in Sri Lanka feel an increased sense of caution and fear due to anti-Muslim changes in policy and increasingly negative public perception.
“We don’t feel like we have the freedom to practice our religion and live without judgment,” said one member of the Muslim community. “It feels like our right to be Sri Lankan and Muslim at the same time is continuously questioned,’’ said another.
Although racism against the Muslim ethnic minority has been present in Sri Lanka since the colonial period, the post-war years, especially between 2013-2014, saw a sharp increase in racist vitriol. This period was marked by riots, attacks on Muslim-owned businesses and properties, the destruction of mosques, and calls to ban halal certification and face veils. But what caused the drastic shift in anti-Muslim sentiments in the post-war context? According to Gehan Gunatilleke Chronic and the Entrenched: Ethno-Religious Violence in Sri Lanka, there are three main drivers of ethnoreligious violence in Sri Lanka: the Sinhala-Buddhist majority’s avowed supremacism, alongside their existential demographic fears, and the Sinhalese-Buddhist clergy’s monastic exceptionalism.
Historically, religion and religious identity have been used to consolidate power in the country. Therefore, in an attempt to consolidate power, the post-war government adopted policies and ideals that would strengthen its Sinhalese-Buddhist identity. This climate made it easy for ultra-nationalist groups like the Sinhala Ravaya, Ravana Balaya, and Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) to emerge with a significant following. These groups carry out attacks on religious minorities with impunity. The BBS’s ideology focuses on strengthening Sinhalese hegemony and restoring their “lost” glory.
Islamophobia through the years
In 2013, at a rally with 16,000 people, BBS’s General Secretary Gnanasara Thero warned the crowd about “Muslim extremists” who were “destroying the Sinhala race.” At the same rally, the BBS compiled a ten-point statement to be handed over to the government, known as the Maharagama Declaration. The declaration called for a ban on all halal certifications and food from supermarkets and an investigation into funds coming into the country from the Middle East. The traditional attire of Muslim women, also known as the abaya, was also mocked as the clothing of a gonibilla — a monster from children’s tales.
In June 2014, ethno-religious tensions in Aluthgama boiled over following an inflammatory speech made by Gnanasara Thero. Several Sinhalese mobs attacked Muslim-owned businesses and homes across Beruwela, Aluthgama, Mathugama, and Wellipana. The riots resulted in three deaths and the destruction of over 200 Muslim houses and 120 Muslim-owned businesses. About 10,000 people were displaced. Despite several arrests, there is no public record of any prosecution.
In February 2018, a group of Sinhalese youth in Ampara alleged that they had found sterilization pills in their food. The owner of the restaurant and Muslim-owned hotels and businesses nearby were consequently attacked. The allegations were subsequently proven false, but that did not stop the disinformation from spreading. The inaction and failure of authorities to dispel the misinformation exacerbated the resulting violence.
In March of that year, anti-Muslim mob violence in Kandy destroyed several mosques and nearly 465 Muslim-owned businesses and properties. This violence was linked to a road accident and altercation between four Muslim youths and a Sinhalese driver, which resulted in the Sinhalese driver succumbing to his injuries. Within a few hours of his death, mobs attacked mosques, Muslim-owned businesses and properties in Kandy. Eyewitness accounts claim that even though a curfew was imposed to contain the violence, mobs were able to roam freely and attack properties without being stopped by law enforcement authorities. Despite several arrests, there is no publicly known prosecution of the perpetrators.
2019 Easter Sunday Attacks
This cycle of anti-Muslim violence further intensified after the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks. The attacks were carried out by suicide bombers belonging to an Muslim extremist group — National Thowheed Jamath. Churches in Negombo, Colombo, and Batticaloa, along with prominent hotels in Colombo, were bombed, killing 269 individuals and injuring at least 500. In the aftermath of the attacks, riots erupted across the North Western Province, with mosques and businesses once again set ablaze. Muslims faced attacks, temporary bans on the niqab and burqa were imposed, and rumors, along with disinformation, spread widely, claiming that Muslims were stockpiling weapons in their homes and mosques.
Mosques and Muslim houses were searched for weapons, and several madrasas (Muslim religious schools) were closed due to reports of extremist teachings. Many Muslims, particularly young men and boys from the Eastern Province, where the suicide bombers originated, were detained under anti-terrorism laws.
Some were arrested on allegations of attending extremist camps run by the suicide bombers, while others faced absurd charges such as sewing clothes for the families of the bombers, teaching tuition classes to one of their children, or purchasing a second-hand bike from one of the attackers.
Dr. Segu Shihabdeen Mohammed Shafi, a Muslim doctor, was arrested after a news report in a Sinhala nationalist paper alleged that he had secretly sterilized over 4000 Sinhala Buddhist women after performing Cesarean deliveries. The allegations were later proven to be false, but the incident fueled widespread anti-Muslim rumors, including the baseless claim that Muslims use birth control to subjugate the Sinhalese population and alter the demographic balance.
The aftermath of the attacks also paved way for the victory of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, whose campaign started just days after the attack. He was portrayed as a “savior” and as the person who would provide justice for the attacks. However, President Rajapaksa’s term did not bring about justice. Instead his term ended prematurely due to the economic collapse of the country. Nonetheless, during his term, he appointed a Presidential Task Force headed by Gnanasara Thero to address “legal reformation.” This task force focused on removing the controversial Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act (MMDA) to “eradicate privileges enjoyed by the Muslim community.”
During the Covid-19 pandemic, President Rajapaksa’s government also imposed a ban on burials of Covid-19 dead and enforced a forced cremation policy. This was due to claims that the Covid-19 virus could be transmitted via groundwater contamination, a claim World Health Organisation (WHO) and prominent Sri Lankan virologist, Professor Malik Peris, debunked immediately. Despite opposition from the Sri Lankan Muslim community, the government remained firm in its stance. It was only after widespread protests and global outrage, sparked by the forced cremation of 20-day-old baby Shaykh, that the government finally relented.
The government tried to stoke ethnic tensions once again by trying to allocate Iranaitheevu as a burial ground for Covid-19 burials. Iranaitheevu is an area that was reclaimed by the resident Tamils in 2018 after their forcible 25-year displacement by the Sri Lankan Navy. Then, Oddamavadi — a highly concentrated Muslim majority area in the Eastern Province, was chosen as the area to bury Covid-19 dead. Residents of Oddamavadi had to give up their land for the burial of Covid-19 dead, a practice barred elsewhere. After one year, the government allowed for Covid-19 dead to be buried anywhere. This year, four years after the forced cremation policy, the Sri Lankan government issued an apology for its enforcement, under which 276 Muslims who succumbed to Covid-19 were forcibly cremated.
With Sri Lanka’s new President recently sworn into office, the country’s political future remains uncertain. The deeply entrenched ethno-religious sentiments continue to shape its socio-political landscape. Unless the root causes of these divisions are addressed, anti-Muslim and broader anti-minority sentiments are likely to persist and grow. As Sri Lanka embarks on a new political chapter and seeks recovery from recent political and economic crises, a comprehensive cultural and societal transformation, coupled with meaningful policy changes, is essential to promote reconciliation and peace among all communities.