Shoeb Abdullah is a digital rights activist and co-founder of Activate Rights, a non-profit organization dedicated to protecting digital rights in Bangladesh. He is also co-founder of the Bangladesh Protest Archive, which documented evidence of state violence and civil resistance during the July 2024 uprising. His work includes open-source investigations into human rights abuses, in collaboration with investigative outlets to support transitional justice efforts in Bangladesh.
In this interview, Shoeb examines the evolving role of digital platforms following the 2024 uprising, their dual function in enabling mobilisation and amplifying disinformation, the cross-border narratives that shaped public perception, the risks faced by minority communities, and the limited response of social media platforms.
This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
Sourav Dihingia: Since the student-led uprising of 2024, how have digital platforms functioned both as tools of mobilisation and as sources of misinformation?
Shoeb Abdullah: This question has two distinct aspects. The first concerns the role that digital platforms and social media played during the uprising itself. On that front, there is already a considerable body of literature showing how the internet and social media facilitated mobilization and communication throughout the movement.
The second aspect relates to information integrity and the disinformation environment. The situation during the uprising, immediately after it, and in the current period is quite different. After the uprising, many people in Bangladesh experienced, perhaps for the first time, what could be described as “industrial-scale disinformation.”
Based on the evidence we examined, a significant portion of this disinformation, possibly around 80 percent, originated in India. Many of these narratives were repeatedly debunked by fact-checkers. In the immediate aftermath of the uprising, the country was in a state of uncertainty: there was widespread panic, and the law enforcement system was not fully stable. During this period, there were indeed a few disturbing incidents, including attacks on minorities and other isolated episodes of violence.
However, we observed that Indian media outlets amplified these incidents in a highly distorted manner. In many cases, the coverage resembled a disinformation campaign, exaggerating or misrepresenting events. This created an additional layer of panic among people in Bangladesh, among both supporters and non-supporters of the uprising alike.
Over time, we also saw how this disinformation evolved. Initially, many of the narratives were being pushed primarily by coordinated social media accounts or networks that frequently circulated misleading content. But within one or two months, the disinformation did not remain confined to social media, and it began appearing in mainstream media discussions and in statements by public officials. It became clear that traditional debunking alone was not sufficient to counter disinformation at this industrial scale.
SD. Bangladesh is navigating a very delicate political transition. What does the disinformation landscape in Bangladesh look like right now?
SA: The situation has evolved somewhat with the formation of a new government in Bangladesh. Currently, Bangladesh and India are engaged in dialogue and attempting to address some of the contentious issues between them. As a result, disinformation campaigns are no longer directed primarily against the government itself. Instead, many misleading narratives now focus on religious issues, social tensions, or identity-related topics. Disinformation remains present, but it is no longer operating at the same intensity as in the immediate aftermath of the uprising.
It is also important to recognize that multiple actors have contributed to the broader disinformation environment. One set of actors consists of networks associated with the previous ruling regime, including individuals affiliated with the Awami League. Many of these actors maintained close connections with media networks in India and were involved in spreading narratives that were often misleading, exaggerated, or unproven.
Another category of disinformation actors is more homegrown. Every political party in Bangladesh maintains informal online networks that spread propaganda or counter-narratives. During periods when disinformation from India and actors linked to the previous regime was at its peak, some Bangladeshi groups responded by producing their own misleading narratives directed against India. While these responses were often framed as counter-propaganda, they also contributed to the broader information disorder and were harmful, particularly to minority communities.
Over time, however, many of these smaller networks have weakened or disappeared. They lacked the institutional backing and resources needed to sustain coordinated campaigns.
SD. There’s been considerable discussion about disinformation being pushed into Bangladesh from outside the country, whether from regional actors, diaspora networks, or foreign political interests. How significant is the external dimension of Bangladesh’s disinformation ecosystem?
SA: In the immediate aftermath of the uprising, the volume of misleading claims circulating online was extremely high. One prominent example concerns claims about the number of Hindus allegedly killed during the unrest. Some Indian media outlets circulated figures suggesting that thousands of members of the Hindu community had been killed in Bangladesh. In reality, verified reports indicated far smaller numbers, and even among those cases, the circumstances varied—many were not directly linked to protest-related violence. Investigative reporting, including work by the Sweden-based platform Netra News, examined these claims and found them to be significantly exaggerated.
Despite this, the inflated numbers gained traction. Such narratives had serious consequences on the ground. In some instances, members of the Bengali-Hindu community in Bangladesh reportedly became fearful for their safety after hearing these claims and considered crossing the border into India. We later found that certain actors were actively promoting these narratives within Bangladesh, amplifying Indian media reports and encouraging people to believe that the situation was far more dangerous than it actually was.
Another widely circulated narrative concerned the number of police officers allegedly killed during the uprising. It is true that the police were heavily involved in suppressing the protests and that there were documented cases of human rights abuses during the crackdown. In the aftermath, there were also retaliatory attacks by protesters, and some police officers were killed. However, official figures placed the number of police fatalities at fewer than fifty. At the same time, some Indian media outlets were reporting figures as high as three thousand police officers killed, without any credible source or verifiable evidence.
What is particularly striking is the impact such narratives had within Bangladesh itself. When numbers are repeated frequently in media coverage, people begin to accept them as factual. During my work with transitional justice initiatives, while collaborating with institutions such as the UNDP and the UN Human Rights Commission, I interacted with police officers who had themselves begun to believe these exaggerated figures. This is the scale of the impact such narratives can have on a society as a whole.
SD. There is a persistent concern that moments of political transition heighten vulnerability for minority communities. How has the post-uprising environment affected minorities online? How have the disinformation or hate campaigns specifically endangered religious and ethnic minorities, and have digital platforms done anything to mitigate that risk?
SA: I think to understand the impact on minority communities, it is important to place the situation in context. Religious minorities in Bangladesh, especially the Hindu community, represent a relatively small proportion of the population but historically hold a visible presence and are empowered in social and political life. Many members of the Hindu community have historically been associated with the Awami League, partly due to broader political alignments and opposition to right-wing nationalist movements. During and after the uprising, when attacks began targeting individuals and structures associated with the Awami League, some members of the Hindu community were also affected. In many cases, however, these individuals were targeted because of their political roles or affiliations rather than solely because of their religious identity.
Bangladesh has seen similar patterns historically: incidents affecting Hindu communities often end up benefiting various political groups, especially the Awami League. The problem is that Jamat-e-Islami and other Islamist forces have had neither the inclination nor the capacity to protect the Hindu community. So there was no political protection for the community. At the same time, it is important to note that local communities often attempted to protect one another. In many places, neighbours, frequently young Muslim residents, actively helped safeguard Hindu neighbourhoods and temples.
Another complicating factor was the politicisation of casualty figures. Some organisations representing Hindu communities, many of which have political affiliations, circulated figures that did not always correspond precisely to verified incidents. These numbers were then amplified further by Indian media outlets, sometimes inflating the scale of reported violence many times over. When exaggerated claims circulated widely, they were often easy for fact-checkers to disprove. Once inflated claims were debunked, genuine incidents affecting the Hindu community sometimes lost credibility. In this way, disinformation not only distorted perceptions of the crisis but also undermined the ability of Hindu communities to have their legitimate grievances taken seriously. At the same time, extremist narratives also circulated online. Some conservative and radical Islamist actors attempted to exploit the situation by attacking Hindu communities and pushing hostile narratives on social media platforms.
The role of social media platforms has been inadequate. One widely discussed example involved the killing of a young Hindu man, Dipu Chandra Das, whose death was recorded and circulated in videos online. Such content violated multiple platform policies regarding violence and harmful material, yet it remained widely accessible for a considerable period of time.
Facebook, the most prominent social media platform in Bangladesh, was not responsive enough to the surge of harmful content and misinformation. X does not appear to have any meaningful mechanism to address it either. Many civil society organisations working on platform accountability have raised concerns about this issue for years. However, the capacity of these advocacy networks has also been affected by declining funding for digital rights initiatives. As a result, groups that previously pushed platforms to take stronger moderation measures now face significant resource constraints.
SD. The February 2026 parliamentary election was the first national vote since the uprising. How did disinformation shape the campaign? What narratives were most prevalent, and were they aimed more at discrediting candidates or undermining trust in the electoral process? Who appeared to be the intended audience?
SA: This election was quite significant in the Bangladeshi context because it was the first election held after the uprising and, in many ways, the first election in nearly two decades that many citizens considered genuinely fair. The last election widely regarded as credible took place in 2008. The subsequent elections in 2014, 2018, and 2024 were widely criticised and often described as deeply flawed, with limited competition and serious concerns about fairness. As a result, many people, especially younger voters, felt that this was the first time they were meaningfully able to participate in the electoral process.
While misinformation and disinformation did appear during the campaign, the scale of organised electoral disinformation was not as extensive as might have been expected. Much of what circulated online resembled typical political contestation between rival camps rather than coordinated disinformation operations. At the same time, various political groups did engage in spreading partisan narratives. In some cases, these involved attempts to damage the reputation of rival candidates or parties. Female political candidates, in particular, appeared to be disproportionately targeted by online narratives intended to undermine their credibility or character.
From an information integrity perspective, it is important to distinguish between general misinformation and what researchers describe as dangerous speech. While misinformation did circulate during the election period, our monitoring did not identify a significant volume of narratives that clearly fell into the dangerous speech category. Although misleading claims existed, they did not appear to have the kind of widespread real-world consequences that are sometimes associated with disinformation during elections.
SD. When platforms have engaged with Bangladeshi civil society, has that engagement been substantive, like policy changes, content moderation improvements, transparency, or largely performative?
SA: Platform engagement with civil society in Bangladesh has changed significantly over the past couple of years. When I first began working on issues related to information integrity and disinformation, Facebook was one of the few major platforms that had at least some structured engagement with civil society. At that time, there were channels through which local organisations, researchers, and advocacy groups could communicate with platform representatives, raise concerns, and discuss emerging risks in the information ecosystem.
However, this level of engagement has declined in recent years. Platforms are now far less open to direct communication with local civil society groups working on disinformation, digital rights, or media accountability. As a result, the relationship between platforms and local stakeholders has become much more limited.
This was evident during the recent election period as well. While Facebook did hold some discussions with international organisations, it did not meaningfully engage with local civil society organisations or groups in Bangladesh. Local researchers and advocacy groups who closely monitor the digital information landscape were largely excluded from those consultations. A related issue concerns the responsiveness of platform representatives responsible for the Bangladesh context. Previously, individuals in these roles maintained more open communication with civil society actors, government stakeholders, and researchers. In recent years, however, that engagement appears to have become more restricted, and many local organisations find it difficult to establish regular dialogue with platform representatives or receive timely responses to their concerns.
SD. If the platforms do not act and the government cannot be fully trusted to regulate without overreaching, where does that leave civil society? Is self-regulation or community-based solutions a realistic path, or is that asking too much of under-resourced organisations?
SA: A few years ago, platform accountability work and civil society engagement in Bangladesh were relatively robust. At that time, digital rights and information integrity issues were receiving more attention, and there was a sufficient level of funding. However, the situation has changed significantly since then. Many of the organisations and actors who were previously involved in platform accountability initiatives have gradually withdrawn or reduced their engagement, largely due to declining resources and institutional support.
Another issue is the broader condition of civil society in Bangladesh. Many civil society organisations have faced restrictions and pressure, particularly under the previous regime. Because of this environment, many organisations became cautious about engaging on issues of political disinformation and online harms. Even when they do work on digital issues, they often focus on topics such as online scams or digital literacy rather than directly addressing platform policies related to harmful content.
Organisations like ours, which try to address political disinformation and directly question the role of platforms, operate with very limited resources. This makes it extremely difficult to sustain long-term accountability efforts. Fact-checking initiatives do exist in Bangladesh, and they play an important role. However, fact-checking alone cannot combat the broader problem of information disorder, especially when disinformation is produced and circulated at an industrial scale. Fact-checking can function as a first response, but it cannot fully address the problem without engagement with the platforms themselves.
A major challenge is that much of the fact-checking ecosystem is tied to platform programmes, particularly Meta’s. While these programmes provide some support, they also create limitations. For example, even when fact-checkers publish debunking articles, misleading posts may continue to circulate widely on platforms. We are still trying to figure out how we can continue to stay in this space.