Introduction
In the years following the brutal civil war in Sri Lanka, new forms of extremism and religious fundamentalism have emerged in the country. These movements are underpinned by narratives that portray non-Buddhist minority communities (i.e., Muslims, Christians, and Hindus) as threats to the nation. In particular, ultra-nationalist Sinhala-Buddhist groups, such as the Bodu Bala Sena, have propagated anti-Muslim sentiment through coordinated online and offline misinformation campaigns. This enduring political climate of anti-Muslim hostility was compounded by a series of terrorist attacks by Islamist militants on Easter Sunday in April 2019, targeting churches and luxury hotels across Sri Lanka. The aftermath witnessed increased policing, state surveillance, and the normalization of discrimination against Sri Lankan Muslims. The effects were particularly pronounced in the country’s Eastern Province, which was both the site of one of the Easter Sunday bombings (Zion Church in Batticaloa) and home to individuals identified as suspects in the attacks.
While Sinhala–Buddhist–driven anti-Muslim campaigns have dominated national discourse, there are also emerging signs of Hindu nationalist groups gaining influence at the grassroots level in Sri Lanka. In 2016, the Siva Senai was established in the Northern Province with a stated mission to protect Hindu heritage and communities in the North and East from what it describes as “Sinhalization” and from the growing influence of religions such as Christianity and Islam. “Sinhalization” is a term used to describe the perceived imposition of Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-religious identity through settlements, institutions, and religious sites in areas historically inhabited by Tamil and Muslim ethnic communities in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. Similar yet smaller groups promoting Hindu nationalism have likewise emerged within these provinces. Their impact has also been noted by Christian religious leaders, who report that their communities are being targeted by Hindu groups promoting ideologies such as Hindu nationalism or Hindutva, often with links to right-wing organizations in India.
Against this backdrop, this report seeks to map and analyze the presence of three Hindu nationalist groups in Sri Lanka: Siva Senai, Rudra Sena, and Ravana Sena. It examines their presence, activities, and efforts to exploit inter-community grievances and expand their influence from 2016 to the present. This study utilizes a qualitative approach that combines content analysis of news media reports, policy and research documents, and Facebook pages and profiles in Tamil and English, supplemented by additional social media sources.
The report finds that the narratives advanced by these Hindu nationalist groups center on anti-Christian and anti-Muslim sentiment tied to religious conversion, women’s attire, cattle slaughter, and interfaith marriages. Their activities also include attempts to influence electoral behavior through appeals to Saiva-Hindu identity, mobilization around contested Hindu religious and archaeological sites, and the cultivation of transnational linkages with Indian Hindu nationalist digital platforms, politicians, and public figures, as well as tactical collaborations with Sinhala-Buddhist actors.
Overall, the emergence and growing viability of these groups reflects a shifting political landscape in Sri Lanka, shaped in part by the weakening of both Tamil nationalist parties and Sinhala-Buddhist ultra-nationalist formations.
Ethno-Religious Dynamics in Sri Lanka
The majority of the population in Sri Lanka practices Buddhism, followed by Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity as minority religions. Buddhists are overwhelmingly Sinhalese, which forms the largest ethnic group in the country. The Tamil community is the country’s largest ethnic minority and includes both Hindus and Christians, while Muslims constitute a distinct ethnic group who practice Islam and primarily speak Tamil.
Given Sri Lanka’s religious diversity, Article 10 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, and religion to all citizens. However, Article 9 of the Constitution explicitly grants Buddhism the “foremost place,” obligating the state to protect and foster it. This position has been controversial, as legal scholars argue that granting Buddhism the “foremost place” effectively elevates its status above other religions, contradicting Article 10’s guarantee of religious freedom for all.
The discrepancy in legal protection for religious communities underlines a fissure in practice. Since the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war in 2009, there has been a steady rise in the organized targeting of Muslims. Between 2014 and 2018, several anti-Muslim riots occurred in different parts of the country. Such anti-Muslim sentiment and rhetoric intensified significantly after the 2019 Easter attacks and during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, when Muslims were denied their right to burial and were portrayed as “super spreaders” of the virus.
In November 2019, Sri Lanka’s newly elected president, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, openly championed Sinhala-Buddhist values, suggesting the need to protect themselves from other ethno-religious groups. This stance materialized in discriminatory policies such as attempts to introduce a “one country, one law” system, which ignored the customary laws of minority groups. In 2020, a Presidential Task Force was established to identify and allocate land deemed of archaeological importance in the Eastern Province, which had been under heightened surveillance since the Easter Sunday attacks the year prior.
Whilst anti-Muslim rhetoric has dominated national-level discourse, at the grassroots level, both Christian and Hindu minorities have also been vulnerable to religiously motivated violence. According to the National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka (NCEASL), which records incidents of violence against religious minorities, Sri Lankan Christians have frequently been subjected to discriminatory actions, threats, intimidation, and coercion, often carried out by state officials. These actions predominantly target Christian clergy, pastors, and places of worship. Similarly, Human Rights Watch reports that Hindus in Sri Lanka have been denied access to certain places of worship, witnessed damage to religious idols, and seen Hindu religious sites re-designated as Buddhist sites, particularly in the Northern and Eastern provinces, where Hindus constitute a majority.
Ethno-religious dynamics in Sri Lanka are thus complex and mediated by the politicization of identities. The emergence of Hindu nationalism as a mobilizing force, however, has been a unique and historically contingent phenomenon.
Hindu Nationalism in Sri Lanka
Hindutva or Hindu nationalism is a right-wing political ideology that promotes India’s national identity as a homogenous Hindu identity. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) serves as the fountainhead of Hindutva, with thousands of affiliated groups in India and abroad that champion and propagate its ideas. India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the RSS’s political arm, draws its ideological foundation directly from this movement.
The Hindutva ideology extends beyond the promotion of the idea of a homogenous Hindu identity within India. It is also closely tied to notions of land and territory, shaped by history and mythology. Central to this vision is the idea of “Akhand Bharat” (Undivided India), an irredentist project in which the present-day borders of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Nepal, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka are united under the Hindu “rashtra” (ethnostate). The RSS actively promotes the idea of an Akhand Bharat.
Over the years, Hindutva has resonated and gained traction not only among Hindus in India but also across the diaspora globally, including within other South Asian countries such as Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. In 2015, the RSS reported that its “shakhas” (branches) had expanded to 39 countries, although in 2024, Organiser, the official English weekly publication of the RSS, noted that it does not maintain official branches overseas, but has inspired many organizations abroad. The regional diffusion of Hindutva ideology has given rise to parallel narratives in Sri Lanka that have adopted and localized aspects of its discourse.
Recent research focused on religious freedom and extremism in Sri Lanka consistently flags the growing influence and anticipated expansion of Hindu nationalism within the Northern, Eastern, and Central provinces of the country. In 2023, attorney-at-law and former Human Rights Commissioner of Sri Lanka, Ambika Satkunanathan, highlighted the emergence of Hindu right-wing groups within the Tamil community. She pointed to the growing influence of Hindu nationalist actors on social media and their increasing presence in offline spaces.
Satkunanathan noted that these groups deploy anti-Christian and anti-Muslim rhetoric to depict these communities as “enemies,” emphasizing that the Tamil community needs to realize that right-wing Hindu groups are not working for the benefit of the Tamil community. They make Muslims and Christians into enemies, all the while enabling abusive state action against Tamils and undermining Tamil demand for rights.”
The following year, Hashtag Generation, a Colombo-based watchdog organization monitoring online hate speech in Sri Lanka, reported on the steadily growing presence of Hindu nationalist groups, which mainly target Christians and Muslims. Their monitoring revealed that “while numerous Hindu extremist accounts and pages remain highly active, resistance to content and sentiments posted by followers appears to be minimal.”
At the international level, the presence and activities of these Hindu nationalist groups have also been flagged. The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, the World Evangelical Alliance, and the governments of the United Kingdom and Australia have all raised concerns about the activities of Hindu nationalist groups in their respective country reports on Sri Lanka in recent years.
The emergence of Hindu nationalism in Sri Lanka threatens to undermine communal relations within the country. According to legal scholar and current Human Rights Commissioner of Sri Lanka, Gehan Gunatilleke, “Hindu antagonism towards Muslims in India, often manifesting in discrimination and violence, has influenced and encouraged mirror antagonisms towards Muslims in Sri Lanka.” Gunatilleke further observes that the rise of Hindu nationalist groups in Sri Lanka has begun to challenge the internal dynamics of the Tamil ethnic community. Since Tamils in Sri Lanka identify as either Christian or Hindu, the exclusive emphasis on Hindus promoted by Hindu nationalist organizations risks creating internal rifts on religious lines within the Tamil ethnic community. Likewise, the anthropologist Sharika Thiranagama notes that “their [Hindu nationalist groups] strategy is not to begin with politics but to build networks in civil society, shaping everyday cultural and religious practices.”
In October 2025, the Sri Lankan government, under the National People’s Power (NPP) administration, established advisory committees to counter distorted religious interpretations propagated by “fringe groups.” Officials described the initiative as a measure to “examine and respond to distorted or misleading religious interpretations that emerge from time to time” in Sri Lanka, which have in the past been responsible for public unrest.
Hindu Nationalist Groups in Sri Lanka
This section examines the emergence and activities of three prominent Hindu nationalist organizations operating in Sri Lanka. It traces their development and presence in the country since 2016, highlighting their ideological roots and organizational structures.
4.1.1 Siva Senai
The most active Hindu nationalist group, Siva Senai, was established in 2016 in Vavuniya, located in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province. The organization presents itself as a movement to mobilize and protect Hindus against what it describes as threats from other religious communities. Its founder and chief organizer, Maravanpulavu Sachchithananthan, a former United Nations official turned Tamil nationalist and publisher, plays a central role in shaping its ideological direction and public messaging.
According to Sachchithananthan, the motivation to form the organization was the belief that Hindus in Sri Lanka face “threats” from Christians, Muslims, and Buddhists. He stated, “Sri Lanka is not a secular country like India. It is a Buddhist theocratic nation. Our Constitution says Buddhism is a priority religion. They [Buddhists] are getting government money. Christians get money from Christian nations, and Muslims get money from Arab nations. Hindus get nothing.” He further claims, “In Mannar and Mullaitivu, [Hindus] face challenges from the Catholics and in Vavuniya it is from the Buddhists who are colonizing through the imposition of Buddhism. In the Eastern Province the Hindus face threats from Muslims.” The Siva Senai’s primary objective is to prevent religious conversions of Hindus, calling it “the biggest problem for us”.
In his statements, Sachchinananthan often invokes the teachings of 19th-century Sri Lankan Hindu scholar and revivalist Arumuga Navalar, who defended and promoted native Hindu traditions in opposition to Christian missionaries. The activities of Siva Senai place strong emphasis on promoting a “Saiva identity.” Saivism is a sect within Hinduism, centered on the worship of Lord Siva, and one of many expressions of broader Hindu identity. Commenting on the name of the group, Sachchinananthan states, “We thought of many names, but since most Hindus in Sri Lanka are Saivites, we felt that something associated with Siva would be appropriate. So we chose Siva Senai.” The group frequently invokes the idea of Sri Lanka, especially its Northern and Eastern regions, as “Siva Bhoomi,” meaning “Land of Lord Shiva”, and portrays it as an area sacred to, or intrinsically linked with, the Saiva community.
The formation of Siva Senai in 2016 was widely covered by both Sri Lankan and Indian media outlets, prompting a range of immediate reactions warning of the danger posed. Several Sri Lankan politicians criticized its establishment. Former Member of Parliament Dinesh Gunawardena argued that such organizations posed a threat to peace in the country: “Our island nation has just come out of a bloody war. We don’t need a religion-based political outfit like Siva Senai. We are aware of what the Shiva Sena is doing in India. I don’t think that we need something like that here.” Meanwhile, former Member of Parliament from Jaffna, M.A. Sumanthiran, stated that, “Assertion of a religious identity is not a bad thing. But at this stage, we don’t need it. Our identity is Tamil identity. We are totally secular. There are Hindus, Christians, and Muslims among the Tamils. All are equal. We can’t divide them on the basis of religion….such organisations can take extreme positions. We already have a Buddhist extremist organisation, Bodu Bala Sena (BBS). Birth of another extremist organisation opposed to BBS ideology is a very dangerous thing. It can create enmity between different religions. Both are called Sena, meaning army. Whatever may be their good intention, but the perception is negative. We can’t have outfits with the names like Sena.” Similarly, Sri Lankan economist Ahilan Kadirgamar commented that a movement modelled on India’s Shiv Sena “can become uncontrollable.” Another former Member of Parliament, Murugesu Chandrakumar, expressed concern that Siva Senai’s emphasis on “external threats” from other religious groups ignored “internal problems” such as caste inequalities and injustices within Sri Lankan Hindu society.
During its formation, Siva Senai stated its intention to seek external support, including funding from India and the Tamil diaspora, as well as the desire to work with like-minded organizations. In an interview for India-based outlet The Hindu, Sachchinananthan stated that the group was created after consultations with several Hindu nationalist organizations in India, including the Shiv Sena political party in Maharashtra, as well as organizations such as Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and the Hindu Jana Jagruthi Samithi. He further reinforced their involvement: “Organisations such as the RSS, VHP, and the BJP are very supportive of this move. I have met the leaders and discussed this in detail.” In India, the Shiv Sena political party expressed support for the Siva Senai, in addition to the party leader Sanjay Raut, who said that “Our party is a Hindu party. We support the cause of Hindus all over the world. We support Siva Senai [in Sri Lanka]”.
Moreover, the nature of Siva Senai operations has led to state scrutiny for potential criminal or illegal activities. In September 2018, Sachchithananthan was summoned by the Terrorism Investigation Department (TID) of Sri Lanka for an inquiry regarding his international travels. During the interrogation, he was requested to present evidence of the organization’s registration, bank accounts, and details of foreign travel. In 2021, he was again questioned by the TID over alleged links to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE was a Tamil militant organization that was based in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. However, the outcomes of these investigations have not been made public.
In addition to the strong presence of Siva Senai, two other Hindu nationalist groups, Rudra Sena and Ravana Sena, are active in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.
4.1.2 Rudra Sena
In 2020, Rudra Sena was formed in the Northern Province. Rudra Sena centres its narrative on ‘othering’ Christians by blaming them for the conversion of Hindus, thus mirroring the messaging of Siva Senai. Members of Rudra Sena are often seen supporting Siva Senai and Sachchithananthan. The group asserts the idea of Saivism as central to Tamil identity, similar to the Siva Senai.
Rudra Sena calls Christian-led conversions a form of “planned genocide”, invoking historical memories of the Hindu community’s resistance to colonialism and Christian missionaries, as well as opposing beef consumption by Muslims. On Facebook, the group describes itself as an organization “against the religious conversion of Hindus and Buddhists to Christianity and Islam”. While the Siva Sena was formed to protect the Hindu community from what it describes as “Sinhalization”, Rudra Sena adopts a contrasting strategy. Through a shared resistance to religious conversion, it attempts to align with Buddhists to broaden and expand its support base.
4.1.3 Ravana Sena
In 2016, the Ravana Sena was formed in Trincomalee, Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province. Its founder K. Senthuran states that he founded the movement in response to what he perceived as the gradual takeover of the Trincomalee district by Muslims. While the online presence of Ravana Sena is relatively muted, it remains active on the ground by organizing protests and commemoration ceremonies in the Eastern province. For instance, in 2025, the group held a vigil in Trincomalee to commemorate the 2006 massacre of five Tamil students during the Sri Lankan civil war.
Ravana Sena is part of the same Hindu nationalist ecosystem, but its footprint is narrower than Siva Senai or Rudra Sena. Its activity is largely confined locally to Trincomalee, and expressed through episodic, place-specific mobilizations (e.g., vigils, protests) with a comparatively limited and inconsistent online record. Given that our methodology for this study prioritizes traceable, multi-source corroboration across platforms, Ravana Sena generated fewer verifiable data points over time; accordingly, it features less prominently in the subsequent analysis than Siva Senai and Rudra Sena.
These three Hindu nationalist groups function as socio-religious and political movements. Over time, Siva Senai and Rudra Sena have especially collaborated closely, driven by shared goals and converging rhetoric.
Online Ecosystem
Since their formation, Siva Senai and Rudra Sena have maintained a consistent online presence. Both groups use Facebook as their primary online presence, which serves as the main platform for outreach and mobilization. Siva Senai’s founder and chief organizer, Maravanpulavu Sachchithananthan, maintains a public Facebook profile with approximately 1,900 followers. In addition, several active Facebook pages operating under the name “Siva Senai” and affiliated with the group were identified, with a combined following of around 15,000 users. Similarly, Rudra Sena uses Facebook as its primary platform for outreach and has a combined following of roughly 9,800 users.
The activities of Hindu nationalist groups in Sri Lanka are frequently reported by Indian Hindu nationalist media and digital platforms, such as “Struggle for Hindu Existence”, an India-based blog dedicated to amplifying issues faced by Hindus across the globe; “Organiser”, the weekly mouthpiece of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS); “Sanatan Prabhat”, the publication arm of the Goa-based Hindu nationalist organization Sanatan Sanstha, which has been accused of several criminal activities, including alleged involvement in the killing of journalist Gauri Lankesh, a critic of Hindu nationalism; and “The Commune Magazine”, a Tamil Nadu-based outlet flagged for publishing Hindu nationalist content. These platforms provide visibility by highlighting the activities and involvement of Hindu nationalist groups in Sri Lanka. This includes endorsing campaigns by organizations such as Siva Senai against religious conversion, thereby extending their outreach to a broader global Hindu audience within India and its diaspora.
The flow of online communication is bidirectional. Several Hindu nationalist platforms amplify the narratives of groups in Sri Lanka, which also circulate and reinforce discourses originating from India. The penetration of Indian Hindu nationalist narratives is evident in the growing adoption of Hindutva vocabulary and symbols by Sri Lankan actors, including the use of the Bhagwa Dhwaj, the saffron flag associated with Hindu nationalism in India, across digital platforms and in offline demonstrations.
Their online rhetoric also mirrors the idioms and framing common to Hindu nationalist discourse in India, employing terms such as “Love Jihad” (a conspiracy theory alleging that Muslim men marry Hindu women to convert them to Islam) and “Hindu Genocide.” In this way, online spaces have facilitated transnational linkages between Hindu nationalist supporters in both countries, enabling the rapid circulation of shared narratives, symbols, and mobilization frames.
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