In a 2024 interview that drew global attention, then-Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Hsien Loong mentioned that the “wokeness” movement in the West has led to extreme attitudes and social norms. “Life becomes very burdensome” he said, referring to the hypersensitivity surrounding issues pertaining to one’s subgroup, giving examples like “safe spaces” and “appropriate pronouns.”.
However, concerns over the impact of “woke culture” on social cohesion is remiss without an examination of reactionary responses from the other side of the culture war debate, and more particularly, of the far right. The rise of the far right in Southeast Asia and Singapore has not gone unnoticed. Digital networks serve as a significant medium that facilitates identity formation and group identification amidst increased attention paid to the shift of narratives to the extreme ends of sociopolitical polarization.
Lee’s take on woke culture received praise from Australian television presenters, who cited recent changes in the West like U.K.’s hate crime laws, which presenters say led to the firing of a teacher who challenged a student’s stance on author J. K. Rowling’s views on transgender individuals.
In Singapore, the recent slate of arrests of young men who have been radicalized by far-right ideologies in various forms are jarring amidst a backdrop of institutionalized multiculturalism and tolerance. Even more striking is the apparent foreignness of its ideology in the Asian context. This reflects that concerns expressed over the facilitation of cross-border transfers of identities are not specific only to social justice ideologies considered “foreign” to local conditions, but also far-right ideologies, whose notions of victimhood — at least in the West — have been shaped and galvanized by the cultural impact of progressive movements.
These ideas encapsulate different versions of an ideal social arrangement undergirded by competing notions of victimhood. The existential threat, as outlined by the far right, stands in contrast to notions of inequality and victimhood that animate social justice movements and woke culture. As the Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci argued, cultural dominance can be as powerful as political control. Viewed through this Gramscian lens, the consequent rise of ideological competition for cultural hegemony in information spaces has given way to concerns of growing societal polarization in Singapore, mirroring that which is observed across the globe.
“Woke culture,” and the far right are competing hegemonic projects, and conflicting notions of victimhood, and political polarization is left in its wake. This competition is facilitated by digital networks with the ability to serve as a medium for the transfer of ideas and identities, thus polarization is a networked phenomenon. The rise of a sociocultural context is conducive to the resonance and mainstreaming of far right narratives beyond the West.
The Rise of a Global Far Right
According to researcher Lydia Khalil, right wing extremism has evolved into a transnational subculture. The rise and resonance of far right narratives in the West and beyond can be understood in part vis-à-vis the cultural sway that the left has achieved (albeit without achieving much political dominance). This can be encapsulated by the term “wokeness” itself or “woke culture,” used by many — particularly conservatives — as a broad term for “progressive values” that have swept across the West.
Although wokeness has been credited for revitalizing consciousness about social injustice, the movement has received pushback from both ends of the political spectrum. Criticisms have been aimed at the movement’s alleged propensity to alienate moderate supporters and allies and its focus on political correctness at the expense of productive debate and tangible improvements made to minority communities. Wokeness has also allegedly gained a foothold in popular culture, with accusations that popular culture and brands are capitalising on social consciousness.
The narrative of victimhood that resonates among the far right is partly premised on what “woke culture” stands for, of social justice movements based on understandings of marginality and victimhood of the left. The far right’s platform is thus built on “opposition to the ‘cultural left’” which typically features “support for LGBTQ+ rights, environmental concerns, Islam, atheism, and family forms incompatible with the traditional… nuclear model.”
These social changes have led to a perception amongst some that progressive politics serve as a threat to traditional arrangements of power. Far right narratives capitalize on these anxieties, portraying supporters as victims of the current cultural climate. As Lilie Chouliaraki argues in her book “Wronged: The Weaponization of Privilege,” social media platforms and the far right have transformed victimhood into a weapon of the privileged, where claiming victimhood is an exercise in claiming power.
The Incel movement exploits the socioeconomic insecurities of young men, pinning any blame on the progress made by women and minorities. This “self-asserted victimhood” is often assumed from a position of dominance and privilege, reversing the roles of victim and perpetrator. The global debate between liberalism and anti-liberal, traditionalist ideas is where networks compete for political influence and cultural hegemony. Polarization grows through the same mechanisms that bring in cultural influences. Social media platforms, with algorithms that reward extreme rhetoric over moderate voices, push divisions to the breaking point.
Wokeness and Singapore
Via online platforms, conversations in Singapore on identity and equality have similarly been invigorated by new discourse and notions of justice, further generating discourse and debate on the import of cultural wars from a foreign context.
A clear instance of the internationalization of a seemingly domestic event is the Black Lives Matter movement that followed the killing of George Floyd. Protests and marches erupted in solidarity across the world and sparked reckonings with local racial power dynamics and inequalities. In Singapore, conversations on lived experiences of racism, the treatment of migrant workers, and the recontextualization of Singapore’s colonial past burgeoned online. It also inspired the reinvigoration of online discourse on “Chinese privilege.”
The transcendence of notions of social justice across borders affords new ways of thinking about identities, marginality, victimhood, and inclusivity, as well as the construction of minority identities that acknowledge affinities and establish networks with other similar movements globally. On the other hand, this raises questions of cultural relativity and the dangers of applying “foreign” concepts of social justice. More recently, this debate is prominently seen in discussions of gender identity and LGBTQ+ rights. In Singapore, a student made her experience with being barred from classes due to her presentation public, and alleged that the Ministry of Education (MOE) interfered with her hormone replacement therapy.
In response to a parliamentary question on how the Ministry of Education handles cases of gender dysmorphia, Prime Minister Lawrence Wong said, again, that Singapore “should not import the culture wars” of the West and identifies “issues of gender identity as “bitterly contested sources of division” in Western societies. Prime Minister Lawrence Wong mentioned that “culture wars that began in the West” have created “new forms of identity politics” in Singapore.
For Singapore, these new strands of identity politics are seen as potentially destabilizing to a society ordered by a state-sanctioned brand of multiculturalism. As such, the division in Singapore is often portrayed to be between a woke minority and a silent, conservative majority keen on maintaining the status quo. This may, however, distract from proper examination of how anti-woke narratives and victimhood premised on the threat from progressive politics are an avenue for far right mainstreaming beyond conservative politics. This rings particularly true when the far right has rallied around anti-wokeness, capitalizing on spaces, networks, and audiences sympathetic to anti-woke causes to amplify their rhetoric.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, anti-vaxx conspiracies from the U.S. resonated with some in Singapore, latching onto health insecurities. Vaccine hesitancy among conservative Christians in Singapore in particular received attention with their incorporation of anti-vaccination beliefs from American Christian nationalism. During the pandemic, the far right “consciously appropriat[ed] the language of anti-vaxxers” to exploit resentment and insecurities to expand their reach.
The import of Incel narratives to Singapore also reflects the resonance of foreign notions of victimhood reactionary local improvements made to gender equality. Interviews with local self-proclaimed Incels reveal beliefs of female privilege, and an ire against feminism and women’s rights — typical hallmarks of Incel ideology which they have accessed through manosphere content online. This reveals a pipeline from typical conservative insecurities and the perceived threat to traditional arrangements of power to the consumption of and belief in extreme far right narratives.
There is also an observed rise of conservative voices and movements (the Wear White Campaign, for example) in protest of progress made in the sphere of LGBTQ+ rights. This ultimately culminated in the repeal of Section 377A of the Penal Code. Whether these insecurities, however valid and ontological, serve as fertile ground for far right narratives to resonate and fester remains uncertain. There have, however, been unverified allegations from LGBTQ+ activists that far right actors in Singapore are working against LGBTQ+ rights in Singapore with a particular focus on transgender rights. They also claim that these local actors are funded and influenced by far right groups from the U.S.
Victims of the Cultural Zeitgeist
There have already been arrests in Singapore involving individuals influenced by white supremacist and far-right ideologies, assumed to be endemic of “the West.” The individuals displayed a range of motivations characterized by out-group hostility such as toward ethnic, religious, and gender/sexual minorities. The first arrest was of an ethnically Indian 16-year-old Protestant Christian who was inspired by Christchurch Mosque shooter Brenton Tarrant. The second, a 16-year-old ethnically Chinese male who fervently identified as a white supremacist and developed an extreme hate of non-white communities commonly targeted by far right extremists: Arabs, African Americans, LGBTQ+ communities. More recently, 18-year-old Singaporean Nick Lee Xing Qiu, who was similarly inspired by Brenton Tarrant, roleplayed the shooter in an online game. Lee’s hatred reflects a contextualized version of the Great Replacement Theory to local conditions, wherein the white majority “threatened” by non-white immigrants is replaced, in his view, by a Chinese majority “threatened” by a supposedly-growing Malay minority.
While limited information is available on the exact process of radicalization these individuals undertook, it is clear that they were radicalized in some capacity through online networks. Though they displayed a range of motivations, they are all characterized by out-group hostility towards ethnic, religious, and gender/sexual minorities, and the perceived threat these groups pose to their social positions.
Already, pernicious issues are divisive in online spaces. An article published in a Singaporean local news outlet stated that polarization and extreme discourse can be observed in almost every online discussion of any thorny issue, from racism, immigration, and gender equality to meritocracy, vaccinations, and more. A 2021 YouGov survey found that, among over a thousand respondents, 64 percent suggested that they have observed the increased polarization of views in Singapore’s digital spaces over the last five years. Indeed, these pernicious issues become potential vulnerabilities for extreme positions to exploit and take root — and are also sites where polarization can already be observed. These issues, which see conservative anxieties arising from changes to the status quo, have been exploited by the far right as a means to grow their audience.
As progressive politics gain ground in Singapore, so too does a sense of victimhood premised on the cultural hegemony of “woke culture”. That climate strengthens the avenue for importing far right narratives. The cultural zeitgeist thus presents an opportunity for the global far right; an opportunity to gain sociopolitical dominance via mainstreaming through resonance with conservative insecurities and to globalize its networks far beyond the West.
(Yasmine Wong is Associate Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.)