

The background of the cover features a close-up, slightly blurred image of the Czech flag, showing the white, red, and blue horizontal stripes. Overlaid on the dark blue portion of the flag are several semi-transparent speech bubble icons in various shades of blue and grey, scattered across the upper right and middle sections.

ONLINE **HATE** IN CZECH

Mapping Narratives Targeting
Minority Communities



The Center for the Study of Organized Hate (CSOH) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank based in Washington, D.C. CSOH is strongly driven by its mission to advance research and inform policies that combat hate, violence, extremism, radicalism, and online harms.

Our research, strategic partnerships, and community engagement programs are guided by the vision of a more inclusive and resilient society against all forms of hate and extremism.



Research In Societal Extremism (RISE) is an interdisciplinary research project housed at the Institute of Political Studies within Charles University's Faculty of Social Sciences.

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1. INTRODUCTION

This report provides an analysis of the landscape of online hate speech in the Czech language across major social media platforms. In recent years, the Czech Republic has experienced a continuous escalation of hate and hostility in online public spaces. Predominantly, this phenomenon has been directed toward minority and vulnerable communities such as Roma (2% of the population)¹, migrant (10.4%)², LGBTQ+ (7%)³, and Jewish and Muslim (each below 1%)⁴ populations.

In 2024, the Federation of Jewish Communities recorded 4,694 antisemitic incidents, showing an 8.46% increase compared to the previous year. Approximately 96% of these incidents occurred online.⁵ Comparative European surveys have also repeatedly documented negative attitudes toward Muslims and migrants in Czechia since at least the mid-2010s,⁶ while the government's 2024 adoption of the term “antigypsyism” formally recognized anti-Roma racism as a distinct and persistent form of hatred.⁷ Further, the Anti-discrimination Act of 2009 is an overarching piece of legislation aimed at preventing discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation and gender identity.⁸ Nevertheless, sexist, anti-LGBTQ+, and anti-gender narratives remain present in Czech society.

Despite this, Czech-language online hate remains systematically understudied. For instance, there has been some mapping of the hate climate during the peak of the European migrant crisis in 2015.⁹ Others have outlined gender-based hate against women's participation in Czech politics.¹⁰ A smattering of other texts intermittently cover the last fifteen years or look at the nation through regional comparison,¹¹ yet these works fixate on specific case studies or manifestations rather than providing a broader overview of the online hate environment. Further, hate speech research is overwhelmingly concentrated on English-language content, leaving smaller language communities with limited empirical attention even as harmful narratives adapt fluently to local political contexts.¹²

This report maps the current landscape of Czech-language online hate across five identified themes: anti-Roma, antisemitic, anti-Muslim, anti-migrant, and anti-gender/ anti-LGBTQ+ narratives. It covers both older “enemy” target groups such as Roma and Jews, as well as newer “enemy” groups, e.g., racialized migrants, Muslims, and gender minorities, as part of the same digital hate ecosystem. Drawing on a dataset of 2,500 high-toxicity posts collected between March 2025 and March 2026, we identify the dominant narratives within each theme and trace how they converge on shared conspiratorial frameworks.

Our findings show that online hate might correlate with tangible offline consequences. For instance, stereotypes of Roma criminality documented in this report mirror those implicated in false allegations, discriminatory policing, and disproportionate incarceration of Roma.¹³ Moreover, online discourse places minorities in a position of precarity, undermines civil discourse, and contributes to a climate that legitimizes discrimination and violence.

The period covered by this report was also one of political realignment. The October 2025 parliamentary elections returned Andrej Babiš's ANO to power in coalition with the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) and the Motorists.¹⁴ SPD, a party long associated with anti-Roma, anti-Muslim, and anti-migrant rhetoric,¹⁵ entered government for the first time, and its leader Tomio Okamura was elected Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies on 5 November 2025, the third-highest constitutional office in the country. In our report, Okamura is a central figure who frequently spreads hateful discourse online. The subsequent narratives documented in our findings (e.g., demographic replacement, elite betrayal, cultural incompatibility) are therefore no longer confined to fringe online spaces but circulate in proximity to mainstream political power.

This report is divided into several sections outlining the Czech-language hate landscape. First, the methodology details the keyword-based approach to collect and analyze social media posts using OSINT tools. The following findings discuss five manifestations of hate, each offering a unique perspective on the contemporary landscape. These themes should not be understood in isolation, however, but actively connect and disseminate alongside one another, which is explored through converging narratives. Finally, the conclusion provides key insights and recommendations to (re)focus policy and practitioners' attention on non-English and smaller EU countries' proclivity for spreading hate online.

2. KEY FINDINGS

- Anti-Roma rhetoric dehumanized and excluded Roma, portraying them as inherently criminal, lazy, and dependent on welfare, and as an out-group that does not belong to the nation.
- Antisemitic content consistently framed Jewish individuals and communities as perpetrators of violence, alongside conspiratorial narratives of hidden Jewish influence and control.
- Anti-Muslim content overwhelmingly portrayed Muslims and Islam as a threat to Czech and European society. Approximately 41% of posts invoked narratives of Islamization, invasion, and societal threat, while also using dehumanizing language and portraying Muslims as inherently violent and criminal.
- Security threat narratives dominated anti-migrant discourse with African and Muslim migrants disproportionately portrayed as inherent criminals and violent sexual predators threatening Czech women and children. These narratives featured alongside claims of cultural incompatibility and the Great Replacement conspiracy theory.
- Anti-gender and anti-LGBTQ+ narratives particularly targeted trans people, accusing them of mental illness, biological essentialism, predation, and a threat to children. Such narratives were amplified by key politicians and verified accounts on X, showing this rhetoric carries no social taboo among prominent public figures.
- Across all five categories of hate (anti-migrant, antisemitic, anti-Muslim, anti-LGBTQ+, and anti-Roma) posts repeatedly drew on shared conspiratorial frameworks, indicating that these forms of hate do not operate in isolation but mutually reinforce one another. These overlaps surface in discussions of cultural incompatibility and belonging to the nation, and in warnings of societal collapse.
- Czech-language online hate remains systematically understudied and inadequately addressed by existing regulatory mechanisms. Despite hate appearing across major social media platforms, the Czech Telecommunications Office (ČTÚ), the country's Digital Services Coordinator, still lacks the statutory powers necessary to carry out core DSA functions.

3. METHODOLOGY

To collect and analyze the online hate landscape in the Czech Republic, the research team used the Gerulata software JUNO, which categorizes narratives by keywords and assigns a toxicity rating across all mainstream social media platforms (X, Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, and Instagram). The software provides a constant stream of content based on a lexicon of Czech-language hate keywords, which can then be filtered according to user needs. For the report, the collected dataset entailed a year-long search query via hate-based keywords of the selected targeted groups (anti-migrant, antisemitic, anti-Muslim, anti-Roma, and anti-LGBTQ+/gender) between March 2025 and March 2026, which allowed filtering the content for the most extreme language (rather than posts that simply mention the keyword). With the software actively collecting and monitoring thousands of Czech-language posts per day, this toxicity check is essential. For each target group, the data was then sorted by highest toxicity rating, with the final posts collected falling in either moderate to severe scores.

The research team collected 500 posts for each category—selected and coded separately—for a total of 2500 posts across the dataset. Importantly, the majority of Czech hate content was found on the platform X (approximately 90% of the total). To ensure that the collected data represented the selected theme, the researchers conducted a manual filtering process, removing and replacing false positives. For example, some posts were categorized by JUNO without considering tone, sarcasm, or referencing objects, with defenders of these communities sometimes appearing in the results.

After the data was collected and reviewed for relevancy, each post was thematically coded in an inductive manner via mutual validation. This process allowed for the collective identification of narratives for each category, which were subsequently examined through content analysis. The report's goal is to showcase the prevalence of certain narratives while also highlighting how many of these themes run in parallel with one another. The findings are an initial impression of an under-researched online environment, offering a granular perspective into substance and motivation.

4. ANALYSIS OF MAIN THEMES

The following outlines the predominant narratives found across the 2,500 posts, broken down by category of hate and then examined as a converging discourse. Illustrative posts are used to exemplify each category, while accompanying figures provide more nuanced detail into the discursive themes identified.


Before turning to the findings for each theme, it is important to note the key accounts disseminating hate across the selected topics. Different topics carry different levels of social taboo for politicians and verified accounts to weigh in on, dividing roughly into topics that can be publicly raised with little backlash (or even strong support) and topics reserved predominantly for anonymous accounts. Antisemitism, for instance, is largely avoided by public political accounts, reflecting the Czech Republic's longstanding pro-Israel leanings,¹⁶ whereas all other topics are treated as fair game and frequently deployed as a fearmongering tactic. Tomio Okamura is a dominant presence in the dataset, repeatedly peddling hate-filled narratives across the different themes (especially anti-LGBTQ+ and anti-migrant views). His reach and the engagement his posts garner far exceed those of any other account documented. Other verified X accounts appear throughout the dataset, but their reach and audiences are considerably smaller. Table 1 documents the main verified actors in the dataset. While other research has pointed to the use of bots to sow division and polarisation within the Czech Republic,¹⁷ this was beyond the scope of our research.

Table 1. Top Verified X Accounts Disseminating Hate in Czech

Handle	Followers	Description
@tomio_cz	62.6k	Chairman of SPD far-right political party
@DolphSegal	50.7k	Prominent member of Motoristé sobě and MEP
@Parallelni_Listy	42.5k	"Satirical" account running a conspiracy website
@MatyasZrno	26.7k	Editor-in-chief of aktualne.cz, alternative news website
@petr_macinka	23k	Founder and leader of Motoristé sobě
@Doctor_JR	12.7k	Chairman of PRO political party, pro-Russian narratives
@matesgregor	11.7k	Active youth member of Motoristé sobě
@FoldynaJaroslav	10.7k	Member of SPD far-right political party
@differentdoctor	9.2k	Active anti-Muslim and refugee poster
@volimtricolor	7.3k	Ultra-nationalist Czech political party
@RadimFialacz	5.8k	Member of SPD far-right political party
@RobertKotzian	3.6k	Active anti-migrant poster
@tietzol	3.1k	Member of SPD far-right political party

4.1 ANTI-ROMA PREJUDICE

In 2024, the Czech government officially adopted the term ‘antigypsyism’, stating that anti-Roma sentiments and portrayals of Roma as an “allegedly foreign, [...] different group” constitute a distinct form of racism.¹⁸ While legally non-binding, the decision was seen as a crucial step to bring more awareness to the structural exclusion of Czech Roma and the devaluation of their culture. Despite this official demarcation, anti-Roma rhetoric persists across Czech society and is reflected in online spaces. Our findings not only highlight how antigypsyism is still flourishing online, but also how online and offline racism against Roma can build upon each other, forming a vicious cycle that deepens their systemic exclusion. As shown below, the main narratives concern the exclusion of Roma from Czech national belonging, associations with criminality, laziness, and welfare exploitation, and broader forms of dehumanization.




Examples of Anti-Roma Hate in the Dataset

4.1.1. OUTGROUPING, BELONGING, AND REMIGRATION

In 41 posts, Roma are explicitly depicted as non-Czech, regardless of how long they have been living in the Czech Republic. Among these posts are calls for “remigration” of the Roma to India, even though Roma communities migrated from India several hundred years ago. These calls for remigration mimic the same language used by far-right actors across Europe and North America.¹⁹ The term “remigration” is a euphemism for the mass deportation of people of non-European descent from Europe and North America, applied to citizens as well as migrants; the prefix recasts expulsion as return.²⁰

Moreover, the Roma’s right to represent the Czech Republic is denied: hateful online discourse spiked after Mário Bihári, a Czechoslovak Roma singer, was chosen to sing the Czech national anthem at a celebration held on the Day of Struggle for Freedom and Democracy on November 17, 2025. Several posts claimed that Bihári had no right to represent the Czech people due to his Roma heritage. Some posts went further, calling for the exclusion of Roma from the national parliament, where they are already underrepresented, once again questioning their right to speak for their country.²¹ These sentiments that Roma can never be truly Czech, regardless of their ties to the country, lay the basis for in-group/out-group division and show how everyday visibility of minorities becomes a flashpoint for online hostility.\



Examples of Anti-Roma Discourse Promoting Exclusion

4.1.2. CRIMINALITY, LAZINESS, AND WELFARE EXPLOITATION

Another frequent narrative (featured in 75 posts) is the depiction of all Roma as violent and criminal. Most often, this frames Roma as thieves, but posts also contain references to crimes such as assault. Roma are described as a violent threat to the Czech nation and cities, where places with a large concentration of Roma are demarcated as no-go zones. Past cases have shown that these stereotypes can lead to false allegations of violence by Roma being accepted without questioning.²² Thus, the prevalence of this narrative furthers the systemic inequalities Roma face when interacting with law enforcement, reflected also in the disproportionate prosecution and incarceration of Roma, as well as the use of lethal force by law enforcement officers against them.²³

These depictions of Roma people also extend to being lazy, idle, and abusers of the welfare system, which were found in 58 posts. The online discourse frames Roma people as burdens on society who feed off the state. These narratives have long been reflected in the political realm; in 2018, then-president Miloš Zeman claimed, “I said clearly that I appreciate the 10 percent of Roma who work”, suggesting that 90% of the Roma community do not work.²⁴ Proposals to regionally limit national welfare programs in areas with high Roma population concentrations have been politically debated since 2014.²⁵ The preconception of Roma as welfare abusers has led to immense backlash whenever discretionary welfare programs to address poverty in Roma communities are proposed.




Examples of Anti-Roma Discourse

4.1.3 GENERAL DEHUMANIZATION

Aside from the abovementioned narratives, other general dehumanizing language was present. Such derogatory statements take two forms: 73 posts use the term “gypsy” as a direct insult, often in combination with other negative adjectives, and in a smaller set of 22 posts, “the Roma” is used as a stand-alone term used for negative comparisons. Non-Roma people are insulted as being “worse than gypsies” or “swearing like a filthy gypsy”. Both these categories show that the dehumanization of the entire Roma people has become so internalized that the term “Roma” itself can be used as a synonym for undesirable traits.

4.2 ANTISEMITISM

Antisemitic discourse drew heavily on Israel’s genocide in Gaza and other conflicts including the US-Israel war on Iran. Some posts criticize Israel, Zionism, or the Czech government’s support for Israel—but not Jews as people or as a group. These were not classified as antisemitic. Instead we identified antisemitism where discourse expresses hostility against Jewish people or reproduces established antisemitic tropes. The findings feature several recurring narratives, most prominently portrayals of Jewish individuals and communities as perpetrators of violence, conspiratorial claims of hidden Jewish influence and control, Jews as global elites controlling or facilitating contemporary wars, connections with anti-Ukrainian sentiment, and the use of Jewish identity as a derogatory label.






Examples of Antisemitic Discourse in the Dataset

4.2.1. PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENCE & CONSPIRACIES

The dominant narrative in this category (146 posts) frames Jewish individuals and communities as perpetrators of violence. Posts center heavily on the war in Gaza, utilizing language including “murderers,” “intruders,” and the “perpetrators” of massacres to describe Jewish people collectively. Crucially, the target of hostility shifts from Israeli policies to Jewish identity, a key marker of antisemitism. This framing focuses blame and anger at people who are perceived as being loyal to—or even part of—the state of Israel. This extends to Israel’s involvement in the war in Iran, in which Ayatollah Khamenei is described as “killed by the Jews, with the help of the great powers”, collapsing the distinction between the Israeli state and Jewish identity. Its reference to “the great powers” further situates this collective attribution within a conspiratorial framing of Jewish influence over powerful states (such as the U.S.) and international affairs.


This conspiratorial thread further escalates into broader narratives of hidden Jewish control. Posts claim that people are being sent to die in the Middle East to serve the interests of “Jewish billionaires,” implying that these elites are linked to pedophilic activities of Jeffrey Epstein as further proof of a hidden underworld run by evil individuals. Other conspiratorial posts describe Jews as “parasites” who are “mounting themselves in our politics”. By suggesting that Jewish people hold disproportionate power, these narratives reproduce long-standing antisemitic tropes while exploiting contemporary geopolitical grievances.




Examples of Antisemitic Discourse

4.2.2. ANTI-UKRAINIAN SENTIMENT

By extension, anti-Ukrainian sentiment combined with antisemitism appears in 32 posts. This theme reflects a Czech information environment significantly shaped by pro-Russian disinformation. Posts attribute the war in Ukraine to Jewish influence, largely due to President Zelensky's Jewish heritage. This narrative illustrates how geopolitical tensions can be exploited to amplify anti-Jewish sentiments through disinformation on social media platforms. In this scenario, Jewish individuals and communities become a scapegoat onto whom dissatisfaction with foreign and domestic policy is redirected.





Examples of Anti-Ukrainian Sentiment in the Context of Antisemitism

4.2.3. DEROGATORY

Finally, a bulk of posts in this dataset contain the word “Jew” or references to Jewish identity as an insult. These posts rely on Jewishness itself as a derogatory label, used to attack, mock, or discredit people, movements, or ideas. Most of these manifestations (75 posts), feature in replies and are usually standalone insults with little surrounding text. By treating “Jew” and related terms as pejoratives, these posts help reinforce negative associations with Jewish identity and help sustain hostile attitudes towards them, even when the content itself has no direct connection to Jews, Judaism, or antisemitic political narratives.




Example of Antisemitic Discourse Using Derogatory Language

4.3 ANTI-MUSLIM BIGOTRY

The posts analyzed in this category reflect a persistent pattern of anti-Muslim hate and bigotry that portrays Muslims as a threat to Czech society, culture, and national identity. Czech public discourse has often constructed Muslims as a fundamentally alien ‘oriental’ Other—perceived as foreign, violent, and oppressive, and incompatible with Czech culture and values—while also routinely conflating Muslim identity with Arab ethnicity. These hostile views regarding

Muslim identity stand in contrast to the Czech Republic's small Muslim population (approximately 0.2%) and are partly sustained by narratives about the perceived failure of multiculturalism in Western European countries used as a warning signal.²⁶ The posts below demonstrate that hostility toward Muslims is structured primarily around perceptions of societal threat, dehumanization, associations with violence and crime, and calls for restrictive or violent countermeasures.




Examples of Anti-Muslim Bigotry in the Dataset

4.3.1. THREAT TO SOCIETY

Islam and Muslims are portrayed as threatening the European way of life, therefore constructing Europe and Islam as mutually exclusive binaries. This theme was most prevalent in this category, accounting for 41% (205) of posts. Common variations included the depiction of Europe having fallen or currently falling to the force of “Islamization” by having allowed Muslim migration, frequently citing Germany and the UK as examples. This process is then often likened to an invasion campaign, or a flooding of Muslims into Western civilization, that threatens Europe’s core existence, safety, and values. Some users even conspire that the EU is purposefully funding (with taxpayers’ money) these waves of Muslims, in order to “shape the identity” of the continent. This rhetoric is dangerous beyond its surface content, cultivating a sentiment of imperilment and existential threat. The same imperilment language has been used to justify extraordinary violence as a call to action against Muslims and is well-documented within far-right terrorist manifestos.²⁷

Although the Muslim population makes up a minuscule amount of the country's demographics (0.2%), the discursive power lies in the combination of imagination and transnationalism. Users, with no local reflection point, look to other countries, both neighbouring and far away, as a type of "what if." For instance, Germany (alongside other Western European countries) is treated as a completely broken example of the dangers of unchecked (Muslim) migration, with non-factual statistics deployed as markers of truth around their propensity to violence. Japan, meanwhile, offers an interesting parallel to Czechia's anti-Muslim stance, functioning as a positive counter-example. Its perceived ethnic homogeneity and strict immigration controls are held up as proof that a modern, developed nation can create and maintain "heaven on earth" by "banning Islam" and blocking all Muslim migration (another imagined claim).




Examples of Anti-Muslim Discourse Involving Securitization


4.3.2. DEHUMANIZATION

A total of 101 posts (20%) used dehumanizing language to describe Muslims. This included slurs portraying Muslims as prone to paedophilia or ethnic subjugation, comparisons to monsters and animals, references to bestiality, and descriptions of Muslims as a “cancer” or “plague.” The dehumanization of the group showcases extensive hate and Islamophobia present within Muslim-related online discourse in the Czech Republic.

4.3.3. VIOLENCE AND CRIME

152 posts depict Islam as an inherently violent religion and simultaneously Muslims as perpetrators of crime. Referenced as murderers and terrorists, the Muslim community is described as dangerous due to their religion. Additionally, perpetration of sexual and gender-based violence, or mistreatment of women and children, is frequently cited (using self-created clickbait headlines with AI-images and news articles from The Telegraph/Echo24 as “proof”). By extension, Islam is described as an unpeaceful religion, with followers believing that there is “no such thing as moderate Islam”, thereby implying that the religion is inherently radical and fundamentalist.





Examples Promoting Violence and Crime Narratives Against Muslims


4.3.4. COUNTERMEASURES

Finally, anti-Muslim discussions center on defensive and offensive calls to action. Both "protective measures" such as deportations, restrictions, and surveillance, as well as direct action language such as violent mobilization against Muslims and full religious suppression or criminalization of Islam appear across 72 posts. The most common manifestations of countermeasures were calls to ban Islam on grounds of violence and societal incompatibility, as well as to deport and outlaw Muslims (specifically in Europe and Czechia, but also beyond) to (re)store safety and peace.

4.4 ANTI-MIGRANT HATE

Across Europe, anti-migrant sentiments have been steadily increasing, while right-wing political parties are mobilizing xenophobic and racist narratives to gain political support.²⁸ In the Czech Republic, the issue of migration is high on political and public agendas, with the country regularly characterized as one of the most "anti-immigrant" countries among EU Member States.²⁹ Our report aims to highlight how exactly this materializes across social

media platforms. Four narratives emerge in particular: cultural incompatibility, migration as a security threat, demographic replacement, and the questioning of Czech politicians' national belonging based on their migrant backgrounds.



Examples of Anti-Migrant Discourse in the Dataset

4.4.1. CULTURAL INCOMPATIBILITY


A prominent narrative within this category (79 posts) concerns the perceived cultural incompatibility of migrants. Muslims and African migrants are portrayed as fundamentally incompatible with Czech and European society and are therefore framed as a cultural threat. These groups are repeatedly described using negative characterizations such as barbaric, extremist, or animal-like. At the same time, the posts do not portray all migrants in the same way. While Muslim and African migrants are most frequently depicted as threatening, others such as Vietnamese and Filipinos, and to a lesser extent Ukrainians, are often presented as willing to integrate and therefore considered acceptable migrants.



Examples of Anti-Migrant Hate Framing Migrants as Culturally Incompatible

4.4.2. SECURITY THREAT (PHYSICAL AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE)

The most prevalent narrative frames migration as a direct security threat and appears in 143 posts. Migration is presented as endangering the safety of Czech citizens through the depiction of migrants as inherently more violent and criminal than the native population. Migrants are commonly associated with theft, violent attacks, and murder, with posts often drawing on examples of crimes committed by migrants in other countries alongside unverified statistical claims suggesting overrepresentation of violent crime. Within this broader security frame, sexual violence is a significant subtheme, appearing in 67 posts. Migrants are frequently portrayed as rapists, with many posts expressing concern for the safety of women and children. African and Muslim migrants are characterized as sexual predators, with statements such as “[they] are the most responsible for ... the rape of young girls in all of Germany and other countries” creating a sense of urgency and often accompanied by calls for action.




Examples of Anti-Migrant Discourse Involving Physical and Sexual Violence

4.4.3. GREAT REPLACEMENT

A closely related narrative, mentioned in 77 posts, concerns population replacement. The Great Replacement is a far-right conspiracy theory that claims native European populations are being deliberately replaced by non-European immigrants in Western countries. Many posts frame migration as a demographic and cultural threat, claiming that migrants are imposing their own culture while gradually replacing the native population through higher birth rates or immigration, leading to a demographic shift. To emphasize this threat, migrants are described using metaphors such as "flood" or "storm," as a perceived overrun of the country.

The narrative is further connected to conspiracy theories alleging that migration is being deliberately orchestrated by elites and by powerful actors in Brussels to destabilize Europe. In some posts, these elites are linked to a secret Jewish network. Others portray Russia as pursuing a similar objective, purposely funneling migrants between the borders of Poland and Belarus,³⁰ or hoping that Ukrainian refugees create unrest across the EU. Together, these claims frame demographic change not as a social process but as the result of a coordinated effort to transform European societies.




Examples of Anti-Migrant Discourse Promoting the "Great Replacement" Conspiracy Theory

4.4.4. OPPOSITION TO CZECH POLITICIANS WITH MIGRANT BACKGROUND

A smaller but notable cluster of 41 posts critiques politicians with migrant backgrounds. Both Andrej Babiš and Tomio Okamura receive negative sentiment, being cast as foreigners meddling in Czech politics. Babiš is described as an economic migrant from Slovakia and portrayed as a criminal and security risk with close ties to Russia, while Okamura is targeted based on his Japanese roots and referred to in derogatory terms on several occasions. The latter is especially ironic since Okamura features as a key mouthpiece for hate against migrants, refugees, and Muslims in the dataset. Nonetheless, neither politician is accepted as a genuine Czech citizen; both are framed as foreigners actively working to destroy the Czech


Republic from within. Statements such as "we don't want to be ruled by migrants from Slovakia and Japan, the Czech Republic for the Czechs" illustrate how national identity in this discourse is constructed along ethnic lines.



4.5 ANTI-GENDER HOSTILITY

The dataset included 103 posts containing sexist content, 161 anti-LGBTQ+ posts, and, most prominently, 308 posts containing anti-gender narratives. The findings below demonstrate how anti-gender discourse combines expectations of traditional gender roles alongside portrayals of LGBTQ+ and transgender identities as mental illness or sexual deviance, biological essentialism, and narratives presenting LGBTQ+ identities as a threat to children and education.






Examples of Anti-LGBTQ+ Discourse in the Dataset

4.5.1. SEXIST TRADITIONAL GENDER ORDER

In 62 posts, derogatory terms like "cow," "bitch," and "monster" are used to accompany attacks on women who are seen as defying traditional gender roles, such as those who participate in politics, engage in feminist activism, or do not identify as cis individuals. Women are frequently portrayed as overly emotional, unattractive, manipulative, or morally inferior, whereas feminism is constructed as a harmful ideology that threatens societal stability by upending traditional gender roles. Some posts responding to women included remarks such as "you're literally a woman, get back in the kitchen," alongside insults about their intelligence and competence. Such language seeks to discredit women's participation in public discourse while reinforcing gender hierarchies in which women are expected to remain in caregiving and domestic roles and defer to male authority.



Examples of Anti-LGBTQ+ Discourse Promoting Traditional Gender Roles

4.5.2. LGBTQ+/TRANS IDENTITIES AS MENTAL ILLNESS

Among posts targeting LGBTQ+ identities, particularly transgender identities, are seen as forms of mental illness. Trans individuals are described as “mentally ill,” “crazy,” “disturbed,” “retarded,” “lunatics,” or as suffering from a disorder that requires treatment or institutionalization. These narratives frequently make comparisons between being transgender and mental health issues like schizophrenia, while some contend that society has mistakenly legitimized what they perceive as a medical or psychological disorder. As a reflection of this belief, some posts claim that being part of the LGBTQ+ community is a curable condition or conscious choice. Their logic draws a direct parallel to psychiatric treatment for other mental illnesses, applying the same framework to being trans or gay. Alongside portraying transgender identities as illnesses, terms like “freaks,” “vermin,” “monsters,” and “degenerates” are employed to imply that LGBTQ+ individuals are subhuman. This discourse aims to undermine transgender identities by presenting them not as valid expressions of gender, but through a dehumanizing lens.

Finally, much like the other themes, the “LGBTI intergroup” movement is framed as a top-down threat imposed by the EU. Discussions center on European parliamentary members (predominantly women) accused of forcing their “perverted” agenda onto Czech society. Within this framing, posts see a major distinction between their own Czech identity and EU-driven liberal values. The legitimization of LGBTQ+ rights is thus read as a direct attack on who they are, and as another instance of Czech society being forced to submit to externally imposed, depraved ways of living.

4.5.3. LGBTQ+ PEOPLE AS PERVERTS

By extension, LGBTQ+ individuals are simultaneously depicted as sexually perverse or threatening to Czech society. In 92 posts, trans individuals are labeled as “perverts,” “deviants,” “freaks,” and “weirdos,” while LGBTQ+ identities are “unconventional sexualities” that should not be embraced by mainstream society. Numerous posts connect transgender people with predatory actions, particularly regarding public restrooms and women’s areas, with others directly associating them with paedophilia. At the same time, any efforts to promote LGBTQ+ activities and/or advocate on their behalf are seen as “perverse propaganda” aimed at normalizing “abnormal” behavior.



Example of Anti-LGBTQ+ Discourse (Perversion)

4.5.4. BIOLOGICAL ESSENTIALISM

Similarly, biological essentialism appears in 62 posts and grounds anti-trans hostility in the language of scientific fact. Claims that there are "only two sexes" and that an individual's sex cannot change regardless of legal recognition, social transition, and/or medical intervention, phrases like "trans women are men" and "a woman cannot have a penis" as common refrains. This discourse heavily revolves around sport and trans participation in women's sport as a dog whistle for hate (which is disguised as a concern for the sport itself).

4.5.5. THREAT TO CHILDREN AND EDUCATION

Finally, in 35 posts, LGBTQ+ individuals were portrayed as dangers to children and education. Schools, NGOs, teachers, and social media influencers were blamed for indoctrinating children into a "trans ideology" by endorsing LGBTQ+ themes, supporting gender transitions, or introducing children to "unsuitable" material. Numerous posts depicted transgender healthcare for minors as unacceptable, labeling it as "mutilation," "chemical castration", or a permanent measure forced upon children. Some disputed the existence of transgender children entirely, claiming that activists, parents, or institutions are coercing youth into identifying as transgender. This narrative often connects LGBTQ+ advocacy to grooming, paedophilia, and child abuse, describing LGBTQ+ awareness raising in schools and educational resources as a purposeful effort to corrupt children through "gender propaganda".





Examples of Anti-LGBTQ+ Discourse Linked to Threats to Children


5. CONVERGING THEMES & NARRATIVES

Across the Czech-language online hate landscape, this discourse is not siloed or isolated. Instead, considerable overlap positions the five themes as loosely bounded yet interconnected, constructed by some users as a single outgroup threatening Czech society. These overlaps predominantly surface in discussions of cultural incompatibility and belonging to the nation, and in warnings of societal collapse should these groups be allowed to enter the country or continue "dictating" its policies. Conspiracy theories evidently serve as the connective thread tying these groupings together into one cohesive threat.

5.1 BELONGINGNESS & CULTURAL INCOMPATIBILITY

A simple device to breed hostility, a sense of urgency, and a communal value to rally behind: that the Czech homeland needs to be protected. This trope appears across the dataset regardless of the specific theme. We can further refine this dichotomous sense of "otherness" and belonging through two discursive devices: (1) migrants, Muslims, LGBTQ+ people, and Roma are framed as not part of the country's ethnic heritage and should be removed (i.e., ethnic nationalism), or (2) the cultures of these groups are framed as antithetical to norms and values practiced in the Czech Republic and wider Europe (i.e., cultural nationalism).³¹ For the former, users are proud to distinguish themselves from the catalogue of other ethnicities in the dataset through vile, dehumanizing language. Others draw comparisons to Trump's rhetoric about immigrants eating pets. The latter is predominantly built on language that positions these outsiders as lesser and disruptive to society's cultural norms. Their arguments revolve around the "fit" of these people into everyday "Western" life. Some even draw lines between groups, for instance, stating that Roma are the furthest they will accept cultural difference. In practice, these two logics rarely operate in isolation, often blending and reinforcing one another within the same posts. The next step in this construction of belonging and otherness is to cast these groups as a direct threat, one understood not as incidental but as a purposeful, orchestrated conspiracy (with these minorities working in unison) to bring down the Czech nation.





Examples of Discourse Related to Belongingness and Cultural Incompatibility

5.2 SOCIETAL COLLAPSE & THREAT

The missing piece in the framing of ethnic and cultural nationalism, and why it matters for the dataset, is that these groupings are positioned as conspiring together to destroy the nation. Three main culprits purportedly share the blame: the EU, Jews, and the "woke" left. Jews are predominantly cast as the linchpin of these operations, plotting the purposeful replacement of the country's native population, a framing that spans both the cultural and ethnic strands of nationalism identified above. By extension, Roma, migrants, Muslims, and LGBTQ+ individuals are the enactors or perpetrators to the puppeteers. The LGBTQ+ community, for instance, is presented as a purposeful perversion of societal norms, a collective effort by the EU and "woke" politics to upset the conservative, traditional gender norms of the country. Violence, including violence against children, is a recurring trope attached to these groups. Sexual violence and rape in particular emerges as a discursive theme, with each community assigned its own supposed proclivity: for the LGBTQ+ community it is framed as a "perverted smokescreen," while for Muslims and migrants, it is framed as an innate, imminent threat. Notably, framing these threats explicitly around children sharpens their emotional and mobilizing power, making the stakes feel immediate and personal for the survival of the nation.

This discourse of societal threat proved to be a powerful tool for mobilizing far-right support in the run-up to the 2025 election, with both the SPD and the Motorists building campaigns around the country's sovereignty and their subsequent opposition to migration and "gender ideology" framed as external impositions on Czech life.³² Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that both parties now hold a significant share of power in the Czech Republic, having secured three and four ministries respectively in the ANO-led coalition government formed in December 2025.

 **Witold Budy**   

Translated from Czech [Show original](#) 

The EU is ruled by a band of perverts who want to disrupt the natural development of humanity and the successive reproduction of the human generation into the future. That is why they support the mentally ill.

Rate this translation:  



4:59 AM · Feb 13, 2026 · 76 Views

 1  1  12  

 **Witold Budy**   

Fvck the žid Kalergi EU they will replace you with n igga 🔥 in hell židovi

10:22 AM · Dec 11, 2025 · 2 Views

 **Witold Budy**   

Translated from Czech [Show original](#) 

You're lying, sir. And go fuck yourself with that woke politics. Statistics aren't racist or hateful. Hateful and racist are the migrants who slit people's throats.

Rate this translation:  

7:41 AM · Nov 5, 2025 · 9 Views

 **Witold Budy**   

Translated from Czech [Show original](#) 

Shit from dung

The radical left is responsible for everyone killed or raped by any migrant from a Muslim or African background.

All of these are victims of the radical left's and Antifa's policies.

So what the hell are we even talking about...

Rate this translation:  

4:11 AM · Oct 23, 2025 · 39 Views

 **Witold Budy**   

Translated from Czech [Show original](#) 

The source of the comic says that trans activists should start killing children until they are allowed to use any toilets they want.

Rate this translation:  

 **Witold Budy**    [@DrKarlynB](#) · Feb 23

Non-binary trans comedian says that trans activists should start killing kids until they're allowed to use whatever bathroom they want.



11:31 AM · Feb 24, 2026 · 956 Views

 10  18  51  1 

Examples of Discourse Invoking Societal Collapse and Threat

6. CONCLUSION

This report illustrates that online hate speech in the Czech Republic is neither confined to far-right fringe spaces nor limited to a single target group. Across the different themes, hateful narratives have reached the political mainstream predominantly through Tomio Okamura and are sustained by shared conspiratorial frameworks that connect otherwise distinct forms of hate. Anti-migrant, antisemitic, anti-Muslim, anti-LGBTQ+, and anti-Roma posts repeatedly draw on the same underlying logic of elite betrayal, demographic threat, and cultural incompatibility, demonstrating that these are not isolated phenomena but part of a broader ecosystem of online hostility.

Extremist narratives do not exist in isolated communities but actively enable, connect, and reinforce one another. The same conspiratorial logic that frames Jewish elites as orchestrating migration also feeds anti-Muslim securitization narratives, which in turn provide cover for anti-Roma stereotyping and anti-gender backlash. Anger and evocative language are the connective tissue, and social media platforms, built to reward and distribute exactly this kind of content, are the infrastructure. The result is that hatred directed at one group simultaneously primes audiences for hatred directed at another, making the whole considerably more durable than the sum of its parts.

This escalation in hateful discourse is sustained and amplified by the retreat of major platforms from content moderation. In January 2025, Meta discontinued its third-party fact-checking program in the United States and loosened its hate speech policies,³³ while X has dismantled much of its trust and safety infrastructure and is subject to ongoing European Commission proceedings under the Digital Services Act (DSA)³⁴. These rollbacks substantially impact smaller language markets as automated moderation systems perform worse in local languages and human review capacity is thinnest in these markets.³⁵ Platforms' own DSA-mandated transparency reports confirm this disparity. For instance, X does not have a single human moderator for the Czech language.³⁶ Users report having their content (and sometimes even accounts removed) with little to no explanation by the platforms.³⁷

In the Czech Republic, DSA enforcement is overseen by the Czech Telecommunications Office (ČTÚ). ČTÚ was designated as the Digital Services Coordinator in 2024, but has still not been granted the statutory powers needed to carry out core functions, including awarding trusted flagger status.³⁸ As a result, no Czech organization currently appears on the EU's trusted flagger list, nor can one apply for this and/or vetted researcher status. This institutional gap sits alongside a broader awareness problem. A 2025 CEDMO/Ipsos survey found that only 14% of the Czech population had heard of the DSA, and just 32% of respondents could correctly identify ČTÚ as their national DSA coordinator, one of the lowest rates surveyed.³⁹ Czech users reporting hate content are largely left relying on platforms' own moderation systems, rather than the priority-review mechanism the DSA establishes for trusted flaggers. Between an unempowered coordinator and a public that barely knows the regulation exists,

there is effectively no functioning path for Czech users to invoke the DSA's protections against hate speech. Our findings reflect this, showing Czech-language hate speech that remained live on platforms despite falling within policy violations that should trigger removal.

This report also highlights a gap that goes beyond the Czech context. Hate speech research has overwhelmingly focused on English-language content, leaving smaller language communities with far less academic and policy attention. This fact is not helped by the restricted data access faced by researchers to mainstream platforms.⁴⁰ Harmful narratives do not stay within linguistic boundaries; they adapt to local political contexts and exploit the reduced scrutiny that smaller languages receive. Understanding how hate spreads across languages and geographies is not a secondary concern but a necessary step toward addressing it effectively. This report attempts to map that terrain in Czech, aimed to serve as a building block for the deeper and broader research the topic demands.

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